Germanwings Flight 4U9525: Cockpit security scrutinized after crash revelations

A person moves the switch of the cockpit door locking system inside a flight

 simulator of an Airbus A320, like the one that crashed in the French Alps.

 (Leonhard Foeger/Reuters)

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As soon as it was learned that one of the pilots appeared to have been

 deliberately locked out of the cockpit of Germanwings Flight 4U9525 before

 it crashed, attention quickly turned to the security protocols relating to the 

cockpit door that separates the flight deck from the rest of the plane.

Those protocols have steadily evolved over the years, but it was one big event 

almost 15 years ago that changed everything – the 9/11 attacks.

Within weeks, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had mandated

 new standards to strengthen cockpit doors to protect pilots from intrusion and

 small arms fire, even grenades. Most airlines, including Germanwings, 

reinforced their cockpit doors.
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What we know about co-pilot Andreas Lubitz

But fortifying those doors was just one part of the security upgrade. The FAA

 also required that cockpit doors remain locked during flight.

"The door will be designed to prevent passengers from opening it without the 

pilot’s permission," a 2002 FAA release said. "An internal locking device will 

be designed so that it can only be unlocked from inside the cockpit."
'The most plausible, realistic interpretation … is that the co-pilot … refused to

 open the door of the cabin to the captain.'- Brice Robin, French prosecutor

That's where things appear to have gone terribly wrong on board the

 Germanwings flight.

Airbus cockpit doors lock by default when they are closed. An Airbus training

 video shows that the A320 cockpit has procedural safeguards in place in the event 

that one pilot inside the cockpit becomes incapacitated while the other is outside,

 or if both pilots inside are incapacitated.

When one of the pilots leaves the cockpit, they can get back in by communicating

 by intercom or buzzer with the person inside. The inside person can peer through

 a peephole or use a camera feed to decide whether to allow that person to enter.

 If there is no answer to a request for access, the person outside can enter an

 emergency keycode to get access. If there is still no response, the door opens

 automatically 30 seconds later.

"There was always the opportunity to open the door from the inside and if that is

 not possible, then you can open the door from the outside via a code," German 

Transport Minister Alexander Dobrindt confirmed Thursday.

But the Airbus video says the person on the inside of the cockpit has the ability to

 specifically deny the emergency access request by pressing an override

 switch that causes the door to do into lockdown mode for five minutes.

 Lufthansa's CEO acknowledged that may be what the co-pilot did in this case.



"There is another code you can actually operate which will also lead to a bell ringing

, and if nobody actually reacts, the door will open electrically and automatically, 

and this can be impeded by those in the cockpit by actually pressing a lever which

 says 'lock' and the doors will be closed for five minutes," Lufthansa CEO Carsten 

Spohr told a news conference.



"It seems to be true that the colleague who remained in the cockpit, the co-pilot,

 denied him access back into the cockpit in order to start the fatal descent in the

 French Alps," he said.

"The most plausible, realistic interpretation as far as we are concerned is that

 the co-pilot – through voluntary abstention, through voluntary abstention –

 refused to open the door of the cabin to the captain, and pressed the button

 which caused the aircraft to lose altitude," French prosecutor Brice Robin said.


Canadian airlines make changes

Many U.S. airlines have a "rule of two" that requires that if one pilot leaves the 

cockpit, another crew member, such as a flight attendant, must replace them in 

the cockpit.

This is not an FAA requirement. Lufthansa, owner of the downed Germanwings

 plane, does not have such a rule, nor is it required to follow such a practice.

Dominic Fouda, a spokesman for the European Aviation Safety Agency,

 told CBC News that regulators there do not require two people in the cockpit

 at all times.

But as a matter of airline policy, several European airlines, including Finnair,

 do require two people to be in the cockpit whenever a flight is airborne. Norwegian

 Air Shuttle, Europe's third largest budget airline, announced Thursday it would

 also adopt the rule requiring two crew members to always be present in the cockpit.

Norwegian spokeswoman Charlotte Holmbergh-Jacobsson said the new rules

 will be in place "as soon as possible" on all commercial flights globally.

In Canada, Air Canada and Air Transat both said they would now ensure that there

 are always two people in the cockpit at all times on their flights.

"Following initial reports on the Germanwings accident, we are implementing

 without delay a policy
change to ensure that all flights have two people in the cockpit at all times,

" Air Canada said in a statement to CBC News.

Air Transat's move to a "rule of two" in its cockpits will be in effect as of Friday, 

spokeswoman Debbie Cabana told AFP.

With files from The Associated Press

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/germanwings-flight-4u9525-cockpit-security-scrutinized-after-crash-revelations-1.3010494